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Abstract
In the 2016 Presidential Election, the movement of well-off, highly-educated suburbs
towards the Democratic Party was one of the most significant yet undercovered stories. In this
paper, I analyze the political changes in suburbs around five major cities (Boston, Charleston
(SC), Cleveland, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis) both in 2016 and in elections dating back to 2000.
I find that between 2000 and 2014, municipalities close to core cities with high percentages of college
graduates became slightly but significantly more Democratic, with much of this movement taking
place around 2004 and 2006. Comparing 2016 to previous elections, I find that proximity to urban
areas was indeed more significant than it was in the past, but much of the change in suburban
areas can simply be traced to college educated voters becoming dramatically more Democratic.
Analysis of opinion data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and the Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) suggests that this movement is likely due to a combination
of liberalizing attitudes on social issues like abortion and a perception of the Republican Party
moving to the right on racial issues. While early analysis of data from the 2018 Midterm Elections
points to the durability of the suburban shift, it remains too early to determine whether 2016 really
marked the beginning of a long-term political realignment in the suburbs.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Fully understanding how and why electoral voting patterns change is instrumental in
elucidating why American political actors make the decisions that they do, and by extension,
why American politics looks the way it does. In the subfield of American election analysis, many
popular recent works, like Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? and J.D. Vance’s
Hillbilly Elegy, have focused on trying to understand why rural areas are trending Republican
as voters seem to vote against their economic interests. While such trends are interesting and
very important in understanding the American political sphere, especially given Donald Trump’s
surprising victory in the 2016 presidential election, there has been far less scholarship on the parallel
trends taking place in suburban areas throughout the country. The story of American politics, once
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one of Democratic cities surrounded by Republican suburbs and populist-yet-swingy farmland, is no
longer what it used to be, and trying to understand the rural voters who went from reliable liberals
to die-hard conservatives only tells half of the story. Yet as reporters and scholars alike obsess over
the “Obama/Trump” voter and try to understand how so many people got the 2016 election so
wrong, there is a risk of overcorrecting and potentially missing pro-Democratic trends that are also
taking place in many areas of the country. After all, looking back on the 2018 midterm elections,
Democrats were able to win the House by the largest midterm popular vote margin since 1974 by
picking up seats that were never competitive before, in suburban areas around cities like Dallas,
Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Washington. In all of these places, Democrats appear competitive
in places that have been voting reliably Republican for decades.
1.2 Literature Review
As discussed above, the existing literature on suburban voting patterns is fairly limited.
Between the backlash against President Obama in the 2010 midterm elections that saw many
rural, traditionally progressive areas flipping dramatically to the Republican Party, to the success
of Donald Trump in the 2016 election in riding a wave of white, rural resentment, much scholarly
research on the impact of place on voting patterns has aimed to elucidate why areas outside of
major metropolitan areas vote the way that they do. In the last few months, as Democrats were
able to win back the House by dominating in well-educated suburban areas, some attention has been
paid to suburban areas, but academic research on the subject still remains fairly limited (Skelley
2018). As a result, this thesis will aim to fill a significant gap in the literature by explaining a) what
characterizes the suburban voters who have been shifting towards the Democrats and b) whether
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there really is something unique about suburbia that has led to the Democratic shift.
Most existing major analyses of suburban politics focus on their unique brand of local
politics, rather than their changing political dynamics relative to the national environment. Some
present suburban voters as fairly well-engaged, basing their vote choices on issue positions and eval-
uations of candidates even in relatively low-salience local elections, which could mean that analyses
of suburban voters’ ideological leanings provide unique insights into their electoral preferences. Be-
cause suburbs are smaller than major cities and allow for more intimate community building, voters
tend to know candidates personally, especially in smaller suburbs. Engagement is further strength-
ened by the high rates of homeownership, which tends to create a more lasting sense of community.
However, suburban voters are affected by many of the same trends that affect voters elsewhere,
including the state of the local and national economy (Oliver and Ha 2007). An alternative view
of suburban voters views suburbanization as a threat to local politics, as suburbs are too large
and interconnected to build the sense of community common in small towns, while they are too
small for voters to feel the large impact of a big city government (Oliver 2001). Many suburbs were
formed to be racially, socially, and as a result, politically homogeneous, making politics in suburban
areas less contentious, and therefore less engaging. Smaller suburbs tend to have council-manager
government structures, which limit the power of a single, elected mayor (if they have them at all),
further destroying the political culture of suburbs (Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012). However, these
few studies on suburban politics tend not to delve into the implications of the political culture on
state and national electoral patterns, leaving a gap in existing research that should be filled.
Other studies focus on demographic changes in suburbs that could inform vote trends,
but don’t expand their conclusions into electoral politics. Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui (2012)
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find that partisanship tends to inform individual relocation patterns, with Democrats moving into
urban areas and Republicans moving away from them. People of all partisan leanings tend to
move to areas that are whiter, wealthier, and less dense than their origins, resulting in a trend of
people moving outward from urban centers. Combined with Republicans’ tendency to move towards
existing Republican areas, this results in an overall pattern of Democrats moving to suburbs and
pushing Republicans further into exurbs. Consistent with this research, Orfield and Luce (2012)
find that, in each decade, what they deem the “ring of integration” moves further from inner-ring
suburbs into middle suburbs, as the suburbs as a whole become less white, and therefore more
Democratic. This integration tends not to be stable, meaning that wealthier, whiter residents then
move out of inner-ring suburbs. Taken together, these studies lend credence to the demographic
change theory of suburban voting. However, further research is needed to determine the extent to
which demographics influenced changing suburban vote patterns, and how demographic changes
interact with preference changes.
Looking more specifically at suburban voting patterns, while there is ample existing
research, there is no single study that looks at (i) recent voting trends in suburbs (ii) on a level
more granular than counties, (iii) while also exploring why suburban voters behave the way they do.
One very early study, looking at how suburbs voted in the first wave of American suburbanization,
found that suburbs tended to move in ways that mirrored their core cities and states as a whole
between 1948 and 1964 (Zikmund 1968). More recently, McKee and Shaw (2003) looked into
suburban gains in the 1990s and early 2000s, finding convincing evidence that suburbs clearly
became more Democratic relative to the nation as a whole during this time period, in contrast with
traditional views that suburban voters made up the Republican base. While they do not look in
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depth into causation, they do hypothesize that this trend results from the ideological movement
of the parties in the 1980s and 1990s, in which the Republicans moved to the far right and the
Democrats moved to the center. Ultimately, they conclude that, while demographic changes were
impactful, migration alone cannot account for this change. However, Gainsborough (2005) finds
that, even when controlling for demographic and other relevant factors, suburban voters in the
early 2000s were significantly more Republican than those in urban centers, lending credence to the
idea that place alone matters in politics, an idea which I will aim to explore further here. However,
Gainsborough does not make any conclusions regarding how the suburbs are changing long-term,
and the voting environment has likely changed significantly in the 14 years since she published her
research.
More recently, Scala and Johnson (2017) compare urban, suburban, and rural counties,
and find a clear continuum, in that voters consistently become more Republican as they move
further from urban cores, a discrepancy which appears to have grown significantly between 2000
and 2016. They note that the classification of a county as “suburban” alone does not predict vote
behavior, with the suburbs of larger cities voting much more dramatically towards the Democrats
than those of smaller cities. While they discuss the liberal ideological attitudes of large metro
suburban voters, they do not really explore what caused the change that they noticed. Additionally,
their analysis is exclusively on the county level, which allows for easy analysis of vote patterns all
over the country, since all states make county-level vote data readily available, but is not granular
enough to distinguish urban cores from inner-ring suburbs, or suburbs and exurbs from rural areas
that may be in the same county. Teigen, Shaw, and McKee (2017) analyze both the 2008 and
2012 presidential elections at the ZIP code level, and find a clear relationship among white voters
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between population density and vote preference. While this provides clear evidence that suburbs
are no longer the bastions of Republicanism that they used to be, they do not really do an in-depth
analysis of voters in suburban areas, although their ability to analyze vote trends by ZIP code is
encouraging for the further analysis conducted here. Additionally, rerunning analyses like theirs,
focusing on race and proximity, on 2016 results should be interesting, given the racial overtones of
that election.
Finally, there are some studies that zero in on the 2016 election specifically, which provide
insight that could inform why well-educated, relatively diverse suburbs are behaving politically the
way they are. However, they don’t necessarily focus on place, but rather the demographics that
correlate with place. First, Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) aim to look at the education divide
in 2016. Unlike many other studies, they focus on the educational divide from both sides, looking
both at the rightward shift of those lacking college degrees and the leftward movement of those
with college degrees. They note that, even though white voters moved away from the Democratic
Party during the Obama Administration, this shift occurred entirely among non-college educated
voters, with college educated white voters moving towards the Democrats. They also find that the
education gap in 2016 candidate support disappears when controlling for race. This interaction
of education and racial attitude was likely very significant in predicting why suburban areas with
high concentrations of college educated voters are becoming more Democratic. Similarly, Schaffner,
MacWilliams, and Nteta (2018) investigate the role of racial resentment and sexism on the 2016
election, and find that these factors predicted vote preferences far more than any economic factor.
Specifically, they find that a respondent’s score on their scales for hostile racism and sexism were
incredibly predictive of vote choice, much more so in 2016 than in 2012. They also find that racism
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is the strongest predictor of whether one moved from voting Democratic in 2012 to Republican in
2016, even though Barack Obama, as the first Black president, was on the ballot in 2012. Like
Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck, they find that controlling for racism and sexism significantly decreases
the impact of education. Finally, Mutz (2018) notes that Social Dominance Orientation, a metric
by which members of groups in power view their position in society as being threatened, was a very
strong predictor of vote choice in 2016, while personal economic status was not. Taken together,
these studies suggest that voting patterns have become much more cultural than economic, which
could result in people of higher economic status in more diverse suburbs moving towards the
Democrats. Overall, this research provides ample evidence of a theory of significant change in
voter preferences, and it should be interesting to explore the extent to which 2016 represented an
aberration from or a continuation of existing trends.
2 Hypotheses and Empirical Tests
2.1 Hypotheses
In order to paint a complete picture of the changing vote patterns in suburban areas, I
will conduct a number of analyses on the voting trends and political preferences among of voters
before, in, and after 2016. Despite the role that President Trump may have played in altering
party coalitions along regional and educational divides, the Republican Party’s movement to the
right on non-economic issues was largely accelerated in the early 2000s under George W. Bush. Of
course, President Bush wasn’t the architect of this new brand of conservatism, as the appeal to
the religious right can easily be traced back to the Reagan Revolution in the late 1970s and 1980s
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(Kazin 1995). But following the fights over the role of government in the 1990s, in which the Re-
publican Party truly emphasized its fiscally conservative bona fides, the Bush era marked a return
to the weaponization of social conservatism for political gains. Bush’s fiscal and foreign policies
were certainly consistent with conservative orthodoxy, but it was his “compassionate conservatism”
and emphasis on personal faith that drove his stances on issues like abortion and gay marriage,
cementing the Republican Party’s stronghold on white, rural areas in the South and making in-
roads on similar areas in the Midwest (Conlan and Dinan 2007). But such appeals are unlikely to
have had similar effects everywhere, and could have had counterproductive effects on traditionally-
Republican college educated suburban voters, whose support for the Republican Party is likely
rooted in small-government fiscal policies. For those voters, the Bush Administration’s embrace of
the religious right, sometimes at the expense of science on issues like stem cell research and teaching
evolution in schools, may have been politically toxic (Judis and Teixeira 2003). We should also
expect that voters closest to urban cores, which tend to be more diverse and pluralistic, and less
non-Black Christian, than exurban and rural areas, would react more negatively to the rightward
shift in the Republican Party (Oliver 2001). While it’s hard to define what exactly constitutes
a suburban voter, I look primarily at voters in municipalities outside of, but relatively close to,
the core cities of metropolitan areas, which tend to have high percentages of voters with college
degrees. The aforementioned effects should be strongest in the 2000s decade, where Bush pushed
social conservatism and Obama inherently made race more salient, but it is possible that the Great
Recession and Romney 2012 campaign could’ve re-emphasized economic issues and reversed some
of these trends. Ultimately, while there will be a high correlation between education and proximity
to city, I expect that both of these factors, for reasons discussed above, will have predicted shift
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towards Democrats. Therefore, I present the following hypotheses:
H1A: In the first few elections of the 21st Century, college educated voters began moving from the
Republican Party to the Democratic Party.
H1B: In the first few elections of the 21st Century, suburban voters began moving from the Repub-
lican Party to the Democratic Party.
As documented in the literature review, the movement of well-educated voters in 2016
is already well established, but a few questions remain. Most significantly, it is unclear to what
extent education on its own predicted the suburban shift towards the Democrats, given that well-
educated voters tend to live in suburban areas, or whether there is some inherent importance
of place, including diversity of ZIP codes and proximity to urban centers. Furthermore, given
that Donald Trump emphasized a wide variety of racial and cultural issues while simultaneously
pivoting away from conservative fiscal orthodoxy, it’s not entirely clear for which reason such voters
would’ve moved away from the Republicans. In addition, since suburbs in many rapidly-growing
cities, especially closer to their principal cities, tend to be diversifying, the effects of changing racial
demographics will need to be separated from individual voters simply changing their opinions.
Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek’s extensive analysis of the 2016 election demonstrated the salience which
racial issues had, and as such, we should expect that Trump’s rhetoric on race likely pushed college
educated suburbanites away from the Republican Party more than his anti-trade protectionism.
If this is true, it would make sense that, even though education has been well-established as a
predictive factor in 2016, when comparing similarly educated voters in different areas, proximity
to urban core is likely very important in predicting movement towards the Democratic Party. This
would also suggest that, even though many suburbs are changing demographically, demographic
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change alone could not predict 2016’s unique patterns. Thus, we arrive at the second hypothesis:
H2: In the 2016 presidential election, proximity to urban centers among suburban, exurban, and
rural voters predicted movement towards the Democratic Party.
Finally, while the 2016 election has been extensively analyzed, it needs to be studied
whether the patterns that took hold in 2016 continued in 2018, given that midterm elections often
framed as a referendum on the President, or whether they began to reverse themselves, given that
Trump himself was not on the ballot. Considering the strength that Democrats had across the
board in 2018, but especially in suburban areas, the answer to this question likely lies somewhere
in the middle. Democrats likely improved upon their 2014 performance more in suburban areas
than in rural ones, given the association of the Republican Party with Trump’s racialized politics,
especially on immigration. At the same time, Trump’s appeal to rural voters likely derived from his
uniquely bombastic rhetoric, while many suburban Republicans aimed to distance themselves from
Trump. It is far too early to tell whether the 2016 election marked the beginning of a long-term
paradigm shift in American politics, but anecdotal evidence should suggest that the influence of
Trump on the political environment continues even without his name on the ballot. Ultimately, it
is likely that:
H3: Suburban voters voted somewhat less strongly for Democrats in 2018 than in 2016 (relative to
rural voters), but still significantly more than in 2014.
On the whole, I expect to see that suburban voters, both due to their demographic
characteristics, namely college education, and proximity to relatively diverse areas, have been
moving away from the Republican Party at least since 2000. However, these trends would have
been greatly accelerated by Donald Trump’s rise to the Republican nomination and presidency in
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2016, and as such, are far more significant today than they were before 2016.
2.2 Empirical Tests
The bulk of my analysis focuses on individual places and county subdivisions (the defini-
tions of which vary depending on the state), the smallest geographic subdivisions for which census
data and election results can be aggregated. Since the lack of availability of data and difficulty
of processing would make a national municipality-level analysis almost impossible, I focus on five
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) - Boston, Charleston (SC), Cleveland, Los Angeles, and
Minneapolis-Saint Paul. These MSAs are fairly geographically diverse, have relatively small prin-
cipal cities (making municipal-level analyses more meaningful), and are located entirely or almost
entirely in states with readily-available election results dating back to 2004 or 2000. I analyze each
municipality’s absolute and relative margins, the differences between the Democratic candidate’s
margin of victory in a given municipality and their margin in the entire state, and conduct ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions on changes in relative margins between presidential or gubernato-
rial elections, looking at the impacts of education, race, and proximity to urban core, the values
of which come from American Community Survey (ACS) population estimates. I also run various
tests that interact years with various other variables, in order to isolate how those variables change
over time. Throughout the regressions in this analysis, year numbers refer to the number of the
election cycle, ranging from 2000 as election cycle 1, 2002 as election cycle 2, all the way to 2018
as election cycle 10. Regressions are run for both individual metro areas and the overall sample,
with municipalities weighted in the overall sample such that all metro areas are valued equally.
For elections held in 2010 or earlier, I use 2006-2010 five year ACS estimates (as both
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census and ACS data prior to this year is significantly more limited), while for elections held in
2011 or later, I use 2013-2017 five year ACS estimates. Given that year-to-year differences in ACS
data are likely due to statistical noise, I tried to minimize the number of distinct datasets used. For
Ohio, Minnesota, and Massachusetts, data are aggregated by county subdivision (cities, villages,
and townships in Ohio and Minnesota, cities and towns in Massachusetts), while for California
and South Carolina, data are aggregated by place (cities, villages, and census-designated places).
For the sake of simplicity, these county subdivisions and places will be collectively referred to as
municipalities. Proximity to the city core is approximated by taking the ZIP code that makes
up the largest percentage of each municipality’s population, matching ZIP codes to representative
coordinates as determined by the Census Bureau, and calculating the distance to the city hall of
the metro area’s principal city in kilometers (for Minneapolis-Saint Paul, which has two large urban
centers, the minimum of the distances to Minneapolis and Saint Paul was used). Because larger
cities and metropolitan areas take up more area, and therefore suburbs with identical distances
from the city core can be drastically different in different metro areas, these distances are then
standardized into proximity ratings (henceforth referred to simply as proximity). Proximity is
calculated by subtracting each municipality’s distance to the urban core from twice the median
distance within its metro area, dividing by twice the median, and rounding up to zero if needed,
creating a standardized proximity scale from 0 to 1, with 1 referring to the highest relative proximity
to the urban core. (In the case of Minneapolis-Saint Paul, due to the unusually large number of
rural counties included in the MSA, 1.4 times the median is used instead of twice the median.)
However, my analysis will not focus solely on election results, which can tell us how
certain types of people voted, but not why they voted in certain ways. I begin the first two results
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subsections by analyzing nationwide survey data from the American National Election Studies
(ANES), in order to establish a broad, national characterization of whether college educated voters,
who tend to make up disproportionate portions of suburbs, became more Democratic over the first
two decades of the 21st Century. I also look at data from the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES), a survey of over 50,000 voters conducted before and after every general election in
midterm and presidential years, led by researchers at Harvard University and other participating
institutions, with polling conducted by YouGov. This study is large enough that I am be able to
limit my analyses to voters outside of the core city in the target MSAs, in order to determine the
relationship between education and location on issue positions, and then between issue positions
and vote choice. While these data are less reliable and comprehensive than election results, they
should allow for a clearer picture of the impacts ideology, and how they interact with education and
location. Vote choices are determined by looking at post-election self-reported votes (and, as such,
respondents who did not complete the post-election survey are excluded), and all other demographic
characteristics and ideological responses are self-reported and collected pre-election. Proximity to
city is approximated by taking a respondent’s ZIP code, matching ZIP codes to representative
coordinates as determined by the Census Bureau, and calculating distance and proximity in the
same manner as that described above.
To analyze the trends in elections up through 2016, I begin by looking at the demographic
and ideological predictors of vote patterns in a national sample, using ANES data, to establish a
baseline as to which issues become more and less salient over time, and to see how college educated
voters as a whole are changing both electorally and ideologically. I then move into analysis of
election results, looking at how proximity to city and education impact vote patterns over time,
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focusing on whether I can establish a statistically significant change in the impact of “suburban
status” between 2000 and 2014, and to see how the impacts of these variables change in 2016. For
the 2016 data, knowing that some suburban municipalities saw massive changes that may not be
explainable solely through voters changing their preferences, I also investigate the extent to which
demographic change was responsible for the shifts in voting patterns in rapidly-growing suburbs. I
use ACS population estimates from 2010 and 2017, and zero in on the Los Angeles area because of
its known demographic changes, to see whether the demographic change theory holds any water.
I then move into analyzing the ideological factors behind the pre-2016 and 2016 suburban shifts. I
begin both of these sections with broad overviews of the ideological preferences of suburban voters
as a whole, using ACS data. I then focus in on the issue stances associated with both proximity
and education in order to try to explain suburban shifts at various points, and look at which issues
seem most responsible for the vote preferences of proximal and college educated voters. I also look
at whether living in areas with high populations of nonwhite people impacts white suburbanites’
voting patterns, in order to try to isolate the importance of exposure to individuals of different
races.
Analysis of post-2016 voting patterns focuses solely on election results, since the 2018
edition of the CCES has yet to be released. However, in order to test the hypothesis that suburban
voters are continuing to become somewhat more Democratic, this should be sufficient. I run various
linear regressions with the demographic characteristics of municipalities, including educational and
racial composition, as well as proximity to urban centers, as the independent variables, and relative
margin changes in election results as the dependent variables. I analyze whether the same factors
that predicted shifts in presidential voter preferences from 2012 to 2016 also predicted shifts in
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gubernatorial voter preferences from 2014 to 2018 (as all states to be analyzed held gubernatorial
elections in 2014 and 2018), to see if suburban voters are really moving away from the Republican
Party, or just from Trump. I also look at the changes in vote patterns in House of Representative
races from 2016 to 2018 to analyze the permanence of any changes that may have occurred in 2016.
Finally, I determine whether swing from 2012 to 2016 itself has a statistically significant relationship
with the swings from 2014 to 2018 and from 2016 to 2018, in order to see whether the Democrats’
gains in 2018 resulted from a continuation or reversal of the patterns that we saw in 2016. While
it will be impossible to fully characterize the state of the suburban vote in a post-Trump world,
given that midterm elections are often referenda on the President, and that Democrats certainly
tried to tie their Republican opponents to the unpopular President, these empirical tests should
provide some indication as to whether the future of the Democratic Party is really in the suburbs.
3 Results
3.1 2000-2014: The Suburban Shift Begins
In 1969, political strategist Kevin Phillips published his treatise on The Emerging Re-
publican Majority, which argued that Richard Nixon’s successful 1968 campaign was a harbinger
of an impending era of Republican dominance in presidential politics, a prediction which largely
panned out. The book recognized racial and cultural conservatism as a key factor behind Nixon’s
successes, and argued that if the Republican Party kept going down the Nixonian path, they would
continue making progress among traditionally-Democratic rural voters. 35 years later, John Judis
and Ruy Teixeira responded with The Emerging Democratic Majority, arguing that the Republican
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Party’s social conservatism had become so significant that it was beginning to turn away traditional
“country club Republicans.” Shortly after Judis and Teixiera published their book, Democrats built
a national majority and took back the House of Representatives for the first time in 12 years, but
the 2006 midterms and subsequent election of Barack Obama are often framed as victories of a
coalition of young and nonwhite voters, with little discussion of changing vote patterns in suburban
areas. In this section, I explore the extent to which college educated and suburban voters did or did
not shift towards the Democratic Party between 2000 and 2014, and whether their vote patterns
and issue preferences line up with Judis and Teixiera’s predictions.
3.1.1 National Demographic Analysis
The predictive power of demographic information, including race, gender, age, and ed-
ucation, on political decision-making is well-established. In this section, I analyze the changing
relationships between education and vote choice in presidential elections between 2000 and 2012,
along with the interactions between demographic data and vote choice, in order to contextual-
ize later analyses that focus directly on proximity to urban centers. These data derive from the
pre-election ANES surveys conducted approximately one month before presidential elections, with
sample sizes ranging from 1,212 respondents in 2004 to 5,914 in 2012. While later analyses focus
exclusively on voters and survey respondents in the five metro areas of interest, because of the
comparatively small size of the ANES, all results presented below use data from the full sample of
respondents. Because I simply aim to present a broad overview of the demographic and ideological
predictors of vote choice, a national analysis should be sufficient.
Looking at top-line demographic characteristics, there does not appear to be significant,
17
consistent change in party coalitions based on education. Interestingly, college education, which,
owing to the high education rates in most suburban areas, is a crucial variable to be examined here,
was not at all predictive in any presidential election between 2000 and 2008 (Figure 1), although it
does become slightly predictive in 2012, possibly suggesting the emergence of a suburban, college
educated, Democratic coalition before 2016. If we look at the percentages of college educated voters
who voted Democratic in each of these years (Figure 2), we can see a clear jump between 2000 and
2004, with no large change in 2008 or 2012, while white college educated voters voted Democratic
at fairly consistent rates, with 2012 as a possible exception. Ultimately, on a national level, the
evidence of a shift among college educated voters is mixed, and if it existed at all, it may be due
to the movement of nonwhite college educated voters between 2000 and 2004. Still, this movement
of college educated voters in general does line up with later analyses of changing suburban vote
patterns.
Ultimately, a national-level analysis of ANES data confirms some of what is widely be-
lieved about the politics of the 2000s and early 2010s, that younger, nonwhite, came to define the
Democratic base, with race becoming even more of a dividing factor in American elections. On
the other hand, contrary to popular depictions of the Obama coalition as revolving heavily around
well-educated white liberals (Edsall 2011), it doesn’t appear that college educated voters moved
towards the Democrats at significant rates before 2016. But suburbs are more than just collections
of college educated voters - it is distinctly possible that place matters beyond the differences in the
demographics of people who live in different places. Therefore, if the analyses below demonstrate
that suburban voters seemed to be shifting more towards the Democrats before 2016, we should not
think of these effects as simply resulting from changes among the preferences of college educated
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Figure 1: In a national sample, education had a minimal impact before 2016.
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Figure 2: Nationwide, movement among college educated voters was small between 2000 and
2012.
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voters.
3.1.2 Changes in Suburban Vote Patterns
Having established that any changes in suburban vote patterns are not simply due to
individuals with stereotypically suburban demographics (i.e. a college education) become more
Democratic at the national level, it becomes important to analyze the impact of physical location
on voting behavior, and whether there seems to be something inherent about the suburbs that
makes a voter more likely to behave in a certain way. Of course, we first run into the difficulty of
defining what a suburb actually is. If we consider a suburb to be a place within a metropolitan
area outside of the core city, we would include poorer areas close to an urban center that aren’t
part of the core city (like East Cleveland, Ohio or Compton, California), stereotypically white
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and aﬄuent suburban areas (like Newton, Massachusetts or Kiawah Island, South Carolina), and
rural townships in counties far from urban areas that are still included in officially-defined MSAs
(like those in Sibley and Mille Lacs Counties, Minnesota). The lack of extensive existing literature
on suburbs makes it even more difficult to clearly define what they are, although Oliver’s (2001)
analysis identifies all municipalities within an MSA, excluding the principal cities, as suburban,
while recognizing that demographics are important in order to properly analyze what people tend
to think of as suburban. As a result, the analyses presented here will consider a mix of proximity to
city, race, and education as important factors in determining whether an individual or municipality
should be considered relevant.
Looking at election results, we see some evidence of suburban areas becoming more Demo-
cratic between 2000 and 2014. Considering individual municipalities within the five metropolitan
areas of interest, excluding those with a proximity rating of above 0.95 (thereby removing the six
core cities), proximity to city clearly becomes more important over time in both presidential and
gubernatorial elections (tables 1 and 2), even when controlling for race, thereby suggesting that,
within a metro area, the discrepancy between more suburban and rural areas has been steadily
growing at least since the turn of the century. This effect is not entirely constant, and appears
to have been declining a bit in 2014 before jumping back up in 2016 and 2018, but a linear re-
gression interacting year with proximity confirms that the effect of proximity on Democratic vote
margin increases over time in a statistically significant manner, even when excluding 2016 and
2018, with each additional four-year cycle increasing the impact of proximity on relative margin by
3.0 percentage points in presidential and 3.6 points in gubernatorial elections (table 3). Interest-
ingly, comparing presidential and gubernatorial results, it seems that the strongest effects occurred
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sometime between 2002 and 2004, leveling off after the 2006 midterms. The potential reasons for
this shift, focusing on the ideological patterns of the Bush Administration, are discussed in a later
section.
Table 1: The impact of proximity on vote choice increased rapidly between 2000 and 2004.
2000 2004 2008 2012
(Intercept) 0.256∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Proximity 0.185∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
White Pct −0.399∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.496∗∗∗ −0.607∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Num. obs. 650 799 801 803
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impact of proximity and race on Democratic presidential vote
margin (2000-2012), using election results from non-core municipalities in the five metro areas of
interest.
Table 2: The impact of proximity on vote choice increased rapidly between 2002 and 2006.
2002 2006 2010 2014
(Intercept) 0.200∗∗∗ −0.003 0.334∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.027) (0.036)
Proximity 0.059 0.264∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.071∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.027) (0.036)
White Pct −0.345∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.600∗∗∗ −0.572∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.036)
Num. obs. 653 801 801 801
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impact of proximity and race on Democratic gubernatorial vote
margin in non-core municipalities (2002-2014), using election results from the five metro areas of
interest.
While the magnitude of the impact of proximity varies from metro area to metro area,
and 2012 seems to represent a more significant outlier in some metro areas than in others, the effect
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Table 3: The impact of proximity increases over time in both presidential and gubernatorial
elections.
Presidential Gubernatorial
(Intercept) −0.419∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗
(0.048) (0.095)
Proximity 0.448∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.028) (0.058)
Year −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗
(0.002) (0.004)
White Pct 0.023 0.178∗∗
(0.034) (0.065)
Proximity * Year 0.015∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004)
White Pct * Year −0.008∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.004)
Num. obs. 3145 3160
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for impact of interactions between year and proximity and race on
Democratic presidential and gubernatorial vote margin in non-core municipalities (2000-2014),
using election results from the five metro areas of interest.
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is largely consistent across the five areas analyzed (table 4). Perhaps most notably, in Charleston,
where southern influences could potentially make wealthy, white voters even more conservative than
expected, and where the outlying rural areas are much less white than in other parts of the country,
the proximity regression coefficient is negative in all four years analyzed. However, since Charleston
is the only Southern city analyzed here, we shouldn’t make broad conclusions about the South.
And even in this case, the regression coefficient tends to increase over time, demonstrating that
the changing political winds in the suburbs were still present in less Democratic areas. Countering
perceptions of a coastal elite moving towards the Democratic Party, while the middle of the country
became more Republican, these analyses suggest that location within a metropolitan area matter
much more for changing voting patterns than location in the country.
Table 4: The increase in the correlation between proximity and Democratic vote margin is
largely consistent across metro areas.
2000 2004 2008 2012
Boston 0.362*** 0.427*** 0.384*** 0.458***
Charleston -0.554* -0.447* -0.340. -0.387.
Cleveland 0.588*** 0.548*** 0.607***
Los Angeles 0.183*** 0.231*** 0.299*** -0.138***
Minneapolis 0.210*** 0.277*** 0.340*** 0.339***
OLS regression coefficients for impact of proximity on Democratic vote margin in presidential
elections (2000-2012), broken out by year and metro area, in non-core municipalities in the five
metro areas of interest. Controls for race were included in the regressions but omitted in the table
above.
However, this only demonstrates that suburbs closer to cities were becoming more Demo-
cratic than suburbs and rural areas further from cities, not that what we often think of as “suburbs”
(predominantly white and highly educated) became more Democratic. Indeed, it is certainly pos-
sible that areas with lower percentages of college graduates closer to cities were responsible for this
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shift. Still, even when we control for the percentages of residents with a college degree and residents
who are white, the effect of proximity appears to be significant and positive in all four presidential
(table 5) and gubernatorial (see appendix B) years analyzed, but an actual trend across the years
is not immediately clear. If we look at the predictive power of education over time, the effect starts
out as negative in 2000, but becomes largely more positive over time. This pattern seems to parallel
the role of proximity in the regressions that did not include education, which could suggest that
some of the suburban shift is due to college educated voters becoming more Democratic, although
clearly proximity plays a role beyond simple demographics. On the whole, even as proximity and
college education both fluctuate in importance, the two variables combined suggest that college
educated suburbs were becoming more Democratic.
Table 5: In presidential elections between 2000 and 2012, proximal and college educated
municipalities tended to become more Democratic.
2000 2004 2008 2012
(Intercept) 0.059∗ −0.060∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Proximity 0.563∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
College Pct −0.202∗∗∗ −0.015 0.108∗ −0.079
(0.057) (0.049) (0.043) (0.042)
White Pct −0.257∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗ −0.518∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
Num. obs. 648 796 798 801
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impact of proximity, education, and race on Democratic
presidential vote margin in non-core municipalities (2000-2012), using election results from the
five metro areas of interest.
Indeed, when including dummy variables for individual municipalities, a regression inter-
acting year with proximity and both demographic characteristics yields a statistically-significant
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increase in the predictive power of proximity and education over time, for both presidential and
gubernatorial races (table 6). In each additional four-year presidential cycle, a hypothetical subur-
ban municipality with proximity 1 would become 1.6 percentage points more Democratic than an
identical municipality with proximity 0, while a municipality with 100% of residents holding college
degrees would become 4.2 percentage points more Democratic than an identical municipality with
0% holding degrees. These results do not counter the ANES results, but rather suggest that for
college educated voters, a movement towards the Democratic Party was stronger in suburban areas
than rural areas, where there are fewer college graduates, and urban areas, where college graduates
were already quite liberal. Therefore, even when we look beyond the different demographic compo-
sitions of different municipalities, there appears to be a small but significant positive relationship
between two key indicators of suburbanization (proximity to city and education) and how likely it
is to vote Democratic, even before the drastic suburban shift of 2016, one which tended to increase
between 2000 and 2012.
So far, I’ve modeled relationships between vote choice and proximity and demographics
to try to determine how different municipalities shifted politically between 2000 and 2014, and
analyzed whether these traits line up with typical conceptions of what a suburb is. But if we look
simply at the Democratic vote margins in municipalities that meet a few stereotypically suburban
criteria, the story becomes even clearer - the suburbs have been getting more Democratic since at
least 2000. And as the results above suggest, this shift is not solely due to well-educated places
becoming more Democratic, or places closer to the city center becoming more Democratic, but both
education and proximity influencing vote choice in a way that results in a significant suburban shift.
For the sake of the analyses below, I define a proximal municipality as one with a prox-
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Table 6: The impacts of both proximity and education increase over time in both presidential
and gubernatorial elections.
Presidential Gubernatorial
(Intercept) −0.412∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗
(0.048) (0.100)
Year −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Proximity 0.414∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.030) (0.065)
College Pct 0.048 −0.080
(0.034) (0.071)
White Pct 0.043 0.231∗∗
(0.036) (0.073)
Proximity * Year 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.002) (0.005)
College Pct * Year 0.024∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.003) (0.007)
White Pct * Year −0.016∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.002) (0.005)
Num. obs. 3121 3140
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for impact of interactions between year and proximity, education, and
race on Democratic presidential and gubernatorial vote margin in non-core municipalities
(2000-2014), using election results from the five metro areas of interest. Dummy variables for
individual cities were included in regressions but omitted from the output above.
imity value above 0.5, a highly-educated municipality as one with a percentage of residents with
a college degree above the median college education percentage for its metropolitan area, and
a stereotypically suburban municipality that is both proximal and highly-educated. Taking an
average of the relative margins for all of the MSAs among municipalities in each of these three
categories, weighted by a municipality’s population, reveals a clear trend. As shown in figures
3A-3C, between 2000 and 2012, the Democratic relative margin tends to increase over time among
proximal, well-educated, and stereotypically suburban municipalities (see appendix C for break-
downs by MSA). Similarly to what was demonstrated above, this effect is most significant between
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2000 and 2004. (Figure 4 demonstrates that, while the margins of the swings were dramatically
different, the municipalities, at least in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area, that became more Demo-
cratic between 2012 and 2016 tended to be the same ones that shifted between 2000 and 2004.)
And while this trend does not hold in every metropolitan area in every year, the patterns are fairly
similar in all of them, hinting at an overall nationwide shift within suburban areas. Perhaps most
interestingly, while college educated municipalities appear to be shifting more Democratic between
2000 and 2008, before jumping back significantly in 2012 (as has been demonstrated elsewhere in
this analysis), the same trend does not hold for proximal metropolitan areas, which became more
Democratic between 2008 and 2012. The net result for stereotypically suburban areas, then, is an
incredibly slight decrease in the relative margin between 2008 and 2012.
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Figure 3: Proximal, well-educated, and stereotypically suburban municipalities became more
Democratic between 2000 and 2012.
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Figure 4: A map of the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area reveals similar swings between 2000 and
2004 and between 2012 and 2016.
Municipality-level map of Minneapolis, Saint Paul, and surrounding municipalities and counties,
displaying the swing in absolute presidential margin between 2000 and 2004 (left) and 2012 and
2016 (right). The core cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul are shown in yellow.
3.1.3 Ideological Changes among Suburban Voters
Having established a clear trend of proximal, well-educated suburbs becoming more
Democratic in the first decade and a half of the 21st Century, it’s now worth interrogating why ex-
actly this change occurred. As discussed earlier, a potential culprit is the changing platform of the
Republican Party, which certainly could have alienated more socially liberal voters, or voters who
identified as Republicans for fiscal reasons but felt that the party was no longer placing emphasis
on such issues. President George W. Bush was the first Republican president to come into power
after the 1990s, a decade that, between the emergence of a new Republican majority and the rise
of conservative talk radio, saw the rise of a new brand of Republican politics dominated by moral
30
outrage towards a culture that was seen as liberalizing (Bolce et. al 2010). Bush himself defined
his administration by “compassionate conservatism,” which tended to further empower a growing
religious right, intertwining Republican politics with social conservatism even beyond what Presi-
dent Reagan had done in the 1980s (Garretson 2014). The clear suburban shift between 2000 and
2004 seems to provide anecdotal evidence that the Bush approach to politics turned off suburban
voters in favor of strengthening the Republican Party’s appeal to rural ancestral Democrats, who
peeled off from the Democratic Party throughout the late 20th Century and continued to do so even
more rapidly in the 2000s (Brady et al. 2009). But this speculative correlation is insufficient to
establish a clear trend, especially considering the changing political environment of the Obama era.
Therefore, in this subsection, I seek to analyze the differences between the ideological preferences
and priorities of college educated/proximal voters and other voters in the five targeted metro areas,
and how ideology may or may not have interacted differently with vote choice over time.
First, I look at national-level ANES data to analyze changes over time in college educated
voters’ views on issues of abortion, government spending, and government assistance to Black people
(referred to in the ANES as “aid to blacks”), all of which tend to be high salience issues, and can
be thought of as proxies for broad views on cultural, fiscal, and racial issues respectively. The
questions about government spending and aid to blacks ask respondents to rate themselves on a
scale of one to seven, while the question about abortion asks respondents to identify themselves
with one of four possible positions, ranging from less to more supportive of legal access to abortion.
All of these questions were recoded on a 0 to 1 scale, with 1 representing the most liberal views
(support for no restrictions on abortion, 7/7 support for more government services, and 1/7 support
for less aid to blacks). The exact question wordings, along with the options offered to respondents
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on the abortion question, can be found in Appendix A.
Looking at figure 5, it doesn’t appear as if college-educated voters nationally had signif-
icant shifts in issue positions over time. There appears to be some slight movement in the liberal
direction on abortion, although very small, and this movement doesn’t correspond with the shift of
college educated voters towards the Democrats between 2000 and 2004. Between those two years,
college educated voters did move somewhat in the direction of being more in favor of aid to blacks,
but this is also a small movement, and their average rating in 2008 is lower than in 2000. Finally,
on spending, there is little movement between 2000 and 2008, but college educated voters do ap-
pear to become significantly more fiscally conservative between 2008 and 2012. This corresponds
with already-identified movement of college educated voters in the Republican direction, which
suggests that, even if they run the risk of losing college educated voters over racial and cultural
issues, Republicans are able to win them back when their fiscal positions shift in the conservative
direction. Taking a look at table 7, we can see that, while the exact coefficients vary over time,
college education, when controlling for other demographics, predicts liberal views on abortion and
aid to blacks and conservative views on spending. But overall, the ideological movement of college
educated voters between 2000 and 2012 is minimal, suggesting that the suburban shift is more
complicated than college educated voters becoming more liberal on various issues.
Instead, looking at how college educated voters evaluate the Republican and Democratic
presidential candidates on these issue scales seems more revealing of why they vote in certain ways
(figure 6). Looking between 2000 and 2004, there is a clear increase in how conservative college
educated respondents believe President Bush to be on abortion, and an even more substantial
increase in how conservative he is seen on aid to blacks. Given that education is predictive of
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Figure 5: Personal ideological change doesn’t explain the suburban shift.
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liberal views on both of these issues, it makes sense that we would see college educated voters
move away from the Republican Party. This movement comes even as Democrats are seen as
getting much more liberal on government spending (although Republicans are seen as moving in
the liberal direction as well), suggesting that the impact of social and cultural issues outweighs
that of fiscal issues. At the same time, between 2008 and 2012, when college educated voters move
somewhat back towards the Republican Party, they view that party as getting more conservative
on spending, again suggesting that Republicans have the potential to win back college educated
voters by emphasizing their fiscally conservative bona fides.
Overall, considering regressions that take in education (and other demographic controls)
as the independent variables, along with issue positions, with vote choice as the dependent variable,
it appears that views on abortion and aid to blacks factor heavily into college educated voters’
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Figure 6: Changes in evaluations of Republican conservatism can explain college educated
voting patterns.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
A
ve
ra
ge
P
la
ce
m
en
t
Issue
Abortion
Aid to Blacks
Spending
A) Average Placement of Democratic Presidential Candidate
on Issue Scales, College Educated Voters, Presidential Elections
2000 to 2012
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
A
ve
ra
ge
P
la
ce
m
en
t
Issue
Abortion
Aid to Blacks
Spending
B) Average Placement of Republican Presidential Candidate
on Issue Scales, College Educated Voters, Presidential Elections
2000 to 2012
Average placement of Democratic (A) and Republican (B) presidential candidates on issue scales
between 2000 and 2012 among college educated voters, national sample using ANES data.
34
Table 7: College education is largely predictive of liberal views on abortion and aid to blacks,
slightly conservative views on spending.
2000 2004 2008 2012
(Intercept) 0.617∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.043) (0.053) (0.026)
College Educated 0.096∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.027) (0.011)
Num. obs. 1462 1033 1005 5296
2000 2004 2008 2012
(Intercept) 0.439∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.022)
College Educated 0.063∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.028 0.032∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.009)
Num. obs. 776 946 1708 4704
2000 2004 2008 2012
(Intercept) 0.688∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.028) (0.042) (0.020)
College Educated −0.048∗ −0.020 −0.009 −0.037∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.021) (0.008)
Num. obs. 723 927 846 4756
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients of impact of education on voters’ views on abortion (top), aid to
blacks (middle), and spending (bottom). Controls for age, race, and gender were included in the
regressions, but omitted in the output above.
decisions (table 8). While the previously discussed ANES data demonstrated a small, if at all
significant role of education on vote preferences, adding in a control for aid to blacks makes that
coefficient close to zero in all four years, suggesting that any trend for college educated voters to
vote Democratic is due in large part to views on race. And while they don’t quite rise to statistical
significance, the coefficients for education when controlling for abortion tend to be fairly negative,
suggesting that liberal views on abortion are even more responsible for college educated voters
voting Democratic. Therefore, it makes sense to conclude that, on a national level, the Republican
Party’s adoption of intense social conservatism in the 2000s was largely responsible responsible for
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an emerging suburban shift.
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Table 8: Views on abortion, followed by aid to blacks, are largely responsible for any tendency
for college educated voters to vote Democratic.
2000 2004 2008 2012
College Educated −0.008 0.015 −0.049 −0.007
(0.033) (0.040) (0.041) (0.019)
Abortion View 0.385∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.052) (0.025)
Num. obs. 1105 799 748 3798
2000 2004 2008 2012
College Educated −0.002 0.006 0.001 −0.002
(0.045) (0.042) (0.029) (0.020)
Aid to Blacks View 0.379∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.078) (0.048) (0.037)
Num. obs. 573 738 1303 3426
2000 2004 2008 2012
College Educated 0.053 0.103∗ 0.010 0.079∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.041) (0.044) (0.020)
Spending View 0.965∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.102) (0.078) (0.045)
Num. obs. 547 739 646 3493
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of impact of education and various issue positions on voters’ likelihood of
voting Democratic, national sample using ANES data. Controls for age, race, and gender were
included in the regressions, but omitted in the output above.
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Next, I use CCES data to look at how proximity and education impact views on issues,
and how issue stances correlate with vote preferences among proximal and college educated voters.
Beginning with the 2006 CCES survey, we can take advantage of consistently-asked questions on
high salience issues, including affirmative action, which can serve as a proxy for broad viewpoints on
race and social standing, abortion, which has its own inherent value as well as value in its correlation
with other social issues, and government spending, representative of economic and fiscal opinions
more broadly. The full question wordings can be found in appendix D, but in order to make up for
subtle differences among question wording and formatting from year to year, the variables analyzed
here will be binomial versions of all of the issue questions. Therefore, the affirmative action variable
represents whether a respondent strongly or somewhat supports affirmative action, the abortion
variable represents whether a respondent always supports the ability for a woman to obtain an
abortion, and the government spending variable represents whether a respondent prefers cutting
defense spending or raising taxes over cutting domestic spending.
Looking at the voters in the CCES sample of the five metro areas of interest, the effects
of both proximity and education on issue stances appear to be changing over time, based on the
results of probit regressions of year, proximity, and education on the binomial issue variables. While
a college education is consistently a strong predictor of one’s stance on all three issues, proximity
is consistently a strong predictor of fiscal liberalism (table 9). Taken together, along with the
ANES data that shows how college educated voters’ views on the Republican Party became more
conservative between 2000 and 2012 on racial, cultural, and economic issues, we can understand
why stereotypically suburban municipalities, full of white college educated voters living relatively
close to urban centers, were moving broadly towards the Democrats through 2012 and 2014. Over
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time, voters in metro areas also became more liberal on fiscal issues and abortion, and although the
interactions between year and education are statistically significant and negative for abortion and
fiscal issues (meaning that, over time, college educated voters became relatively more conservative
on abortion than to non-college educated voters of the same race and with the same proximity
value), as is the coefficient for the interaction between year and race for abortion, these coefficients
are smaller than the overall increase in liberalism among voters living in metro areas over this
time period. Indeed, if we look only at the subset of suburban, college educated voters, there
is a statistically significant movement towards more liberal views on abortion over time, smaller
movement on fiscal issues (p = 0.069), and virtually no change in affirmative action (table 10).
Table 9: Education consistently predicts liberal views on abortion and aid to blacks, while
proximity predicts liberal views on fiscal issues.
Affirmative Action Fiscal Liberalism Abortion Liberalism
Year 0.017 0.054∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Proximity 0.146 0.323∗∗∗ −0.132
(0.119) (0.097) (0.106)
College Educated 0.133∗ 0.119∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.051) (0.054)
White −0.272∗∗∗ −0.076 0.215∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.055) (0.058)
Proximity * Year 0.005 −0.026 0.036∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
College Educated * Year −0.004 −0.014 −0.020∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
White * Year −0.003 −0.002 −0.031∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Num. obs. 8418 9096 9110
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of interactions between year and proximity, education, and race on issue
stances, using CCES data between 2006 and 2014, on voters in non-core cities in the five metro
areas of interest.
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Table 10: Proximal, college educated voters became more liberal on fiscal issues and abortion.
Affirmative Action Fiscal Liberalism Abortion Liberalism
Year 0.005 0.017 0.083∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Num. obs. 1608 1691 1687
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of year on issue stances, using CCES data between 2006 and 2014, on
proximal and college educated voters in non-core cities in the five metro areas of interest.
Finally, I compare the impacts of regressions that consider education, race, proximity,
and each of the three issues, in order to see which issues are most responsible for the votes of
college educated and proximal voters (table 11). The results are fairly clear - in all years between
2006 and 2014, with the exception of 2010, the coefficient for proximity is smallest when controlling
for affirmative action, suggesting that the impact of proximity to city results primarily from more
liberal views on race, even when controlling for respondents’ own races. And in all years between
2006 and 2014, with no exceptions, the coefficient for education is smallest when controlling for
affirmative action. These results are similar to the ANES analysis, which also found views on race
to be impactful (but less so than abortion), but suggest that, when looking at the subset of voters
in metro areas, racial issues take on a slightly more predictive role. Therefore, we can recognize
some inherent and unique factor about location, and how being college educated or close to a city
increases one’s racial liberalism. This analysis doesn’t explain why exactly college educated voters
tend to be more liberal on racial issues, or the direction of the causality, but it confirms that for
suburban voters, liberal stances on race have the potential to be a powerful wedge issue. Taken
together, we see two very important patterns. First, college educated and proximal voters were
consistently getting more liberal on abortion, as the Republican Party made such cultural issues
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more salient in the 2000s. And secondly, views on race appear to be the single strongest driver of
the suburban vote, while the Republican Party moved far to the right of college educated voters as
a whole.
One possible explanation for why suburban voters, even controlling for race, are more
likely to vote Democratic on racial issues is that, in having gone to college and living near cities, they
are more likely than non-college educated or rural voters to be exposed to individuals of different
races. Past studies have demonstrated that, looking at white experimental participants, simple
exposure to images of people from other races can decrease racial prejudice (Zebrowitz et al 2008),
while living in diverse communities decreases the likelihood that white people will reduce members
of other races to stereotypes (Pauker et al 2017). As a result, narrowing the CCES subsample to
white voters and looking at the percentage of nonwhite residents of a resident’s ZIP code could
tell us whether racial diversity holds some impact. However, there does not appear to be a strong
effect. The impact of ZIP code diversity, when controlling for proximity and education, does
increase over time, although it doesn’t reach statistical significance until 2012 (table 12). However,
the impacts of education and proximity remain significant on their own, and the coefficients don’t
change much from a regression that excludes the percentage of nonwhite residents. This is not to
say that interactions with people of other races don’t affect vote choice, since interactions extend
beyond simply living in the same ZIP code. However, when it comes to the suburban shift, there
is something inherent about education and proximity, and how they impact positions on race,
that can’t really be accounted for when looking at ZIP code diversity. In the end, while Bush’s
compassionate conservatism and the early days of the Tea Party movement may have been successful
in bringing voters in rural areas towards the Republican Party, the effect on suburban voters seems
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Table 11: Views on affirmative action can largely explain suburban voters’ tendency to vote
Democratic.
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Proximity 0.184 0.152∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.061
(0.096) (0.066) (0.053) (0.050) (0.053)
College Educated −0.114∗ 0.014 0.032 0.020 0.021
(0.053) (0.037) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
White −0.159∗ −0.035 0.014 −0.040 −0.054
(0.063) (0.048) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Affirmative Action View 0.621∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Num. obs. 476 1028 1809 1872 1670
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Proximity 0.231∗∗∗ 0.093 0.299∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.073
(0.069) (0.071) (0.058) (0.054) (0.053)
College Educated −0.073 0.021 0.076∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
White −0.077 −0.188∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.047) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)
Spending View 0.570∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
Num. obs. 1097 1026 1792 1860 1665
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Proximity 0.329∗∗∗ 0.146∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.119∗
(0.062) (0.064) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051)
College Educated −0.029 0.024 0.052∗ 0.051∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
White −0.080∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Abortion View −0.053 0.475∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Num. obs. 1103 1025 1796 1864 1654
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of views proximity, education, race, and views on abortion (a), spending
(b), and affirmative action (c), on presidential and gubernatorial vote choice (2006-2014), using
CCES data on voters in non-core cities in the five metro areas of interest.
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to have been clearly positive for the Democrats.
Table 12: ZIP code diversity does not account for the Democratic vote in the suburbs.
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
College Educated −0.078 0.069∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.035) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Proximity 0.338∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.141∗
(0.071) (0.065) (0.052) (0.051) (0.056)
ZIP Nonwhite Pct −0.204∗∗ 0.007 0.037 −0.012 0.172∗∗
(0.075) (0.073) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062)
Num. obs. 800 843 1368 1469 1249
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of education, proximity, and ZIP code diversity, on presidential and
gubernatorial vote choice (2006-2014), using CCES data on white voters in non-core cities in the
five metro areas of interest.
3.2 The Election of 2016
It is no secret that college educated voters didn’t care much for Donald Trump. Certainly
Trump himself, who once claimed to “love the poorly educated,” recognized the educational divide
that his candidacy created. His brand of racial and economic populism was largely designed to
appeal to a base of rural, non-college educated white voters, who felt left behind by a system
that they saw as favoring people in urban and suburban areas. And given that Trump’s strategy
succeeded, many analysts and commentators have focused their post-2016 efforts on trying to isolate
how Trump won, focusing on places that swung dramatically rightward while ignoring the places
that flipped in the opposite direction. In this section, I aim to rectify this oversight, analyzing
why the areas that swung towards Hillary Clinton did so - namely, whether such effects can be
attributed solely to education or if there’s some inherent factor about being located in suburban
areas that makes voters more anti-Trump. I also look at the impacts of the issues discussed above,
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to see if the swings in the 2016 election resulted from the race being fought on dramatically different
ideological grounds than previous elections.
3.2.1 National Demographic Analysis
As discussed in the literature review, the impact of education on vote choice in the
2016 presidential election has been well established. On the county level, education, more so than
race or income, predicted a shift towards Hillary Clinton (Silver 2016), and the education gap
among white voters was the widest it had been since exit polls began tracking vote preferences by
education (Schaffner et al. 2018). And more so than in previous elections, many of the shifts within
demographic groups can be traced to ideological and cultural divides between voters, with racism,
sexism, and anti-immigrant sentiments all predicting shift towards Donald Trump (Schaffner et
al. 2018; Sides et al. 2017; Sides et al, 2018). A simple analysis of ANES data confirms these
already well-identified trends (table 13). College education, which didn’t predict vote patterns on
the national level before 2016, became a significant predictor of vote in 2016, with a college degree
increasing a voter’s likelihood of voting Democratic by 17.1 percentage points when not controlling
for issue preferences, and 11.5 points even when controlling for issues. College educated voters on
the national level definitely became more Democratic in 2016, resulting in clear movement within
suburban areas.
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Table 13: Even when controlling for issue positions, college education predicts vote choice
nationwide in 2016.
2000-2012 avg 2016 2000-2012 avg 2016
Female 0.088∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.061∗
(0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.027)
Age −0.000 −0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
College Educated 0.021 0.171∗∗∗ 0.006 0.115∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.027)
White −0.407∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗ −0.333∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.021) (0.016) (0.032)
Abortion View 0.458∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.040)
Spending View 0.923∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.059)
Aid to Blacks View 0.588∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.051)
Num. obs. 7291 2563 4955 2122
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of demographic characteristics and issue positions on presidential vote
choice (2000-2012 combined and 2016), national sample using ANES data.
3.2.2 Municipality-Level Analysis: The Impacts of Proximity and Education
Given the well-known link between education and 2016 vote preference, it makes sense
that well-educated suburbs located near cities would swing towards Hillary Clinton, but the extent
to which education and proximity act independently of each other is not clear. It may be that
college educated voters were uniquely turned off by Donald Trump, and as a result, the suburbs
in which they tend to live became more Democratic. Alternatively, it could be that white voters
in more diverse, liberalizing suburbs voted for Clinton independently of their education, but that
the close relationship between education and proximity made education appear to be the deciding
factor. Looking at a linear regression of proximity to city, racial composition, and educational
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composition of suburban municipalities on relative margin, and comparing the results from 2016
to the average from 2000 to 2012, it appears that proximity and education do both play a role in
predicting vote patterns (table 14). When excluding a control for education, the impact of proximity
to city is more than twice as strong in 2016 than in 2000 and 2004, and almost twice as strong in
2016 as in 2008 and 2012, with movement from the outer edge of a metro area to the center of the
city predicting a shift in the relative Democratic margin by 46 percentage points. Education goes
from a strong negative predictor of Democratic support before 2016 to a strong positive predictor,
as is consistent with the analysis of election results done earlier. When including the education
variable, the predictive power of proximity rises from before 2016 but falls in 2016 (relative to
the regressions run without the control), as we would expect given that the education coefficient
variable went from positive to negative. Proximity does remain a statistically-significant predictor
even when controlling for race and education, but while it’s difficult to directly compare these two
variables since they are on two different scales, it appears as if education, more so than proximity
to city, was responsible for the suburban shift in 2016. Still, what’s most immediately clear is that,
even if a trend of proximal and well-educated municipalities becoming more Democratic existed
before 2016, the changes seen in 2016 are quite significant.
If we dig more deeply into the change in relative margin between 2012 and 2016, the
role of education as a predictor becomes even clearer (table 15). When only controlling for race,
and not education, proximity strongly predicts an increase in Democratic relative margin (in all
metro areas except Los Angeles), as would be expected given the known suburban shift. But when
adding in education, the predictive power of proximity starts to vary while education is consistently
predictive, suggesting again that much of the movement between 2012 and 2016 was due to the
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Table 14: Proximity to city and education both became stronger predictors of Democratic vote
in 2016.
2000-2004 2008-2012 2016 2000-2004 2008-2012 2016
(Intercept) 0.222∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Proximity 0.177∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032)
White Pct −0.450∗∗∗ −0.482∗∗∗ −0.460∗∗∗ −0.352∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗ −0.498∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.031)
College Pct −0.334∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ 0.106∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.044)
Num. obs. 1487 1658 833 1475 1646 829
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impact of proximity, race, and education on a municipality’s
relative margin in presidential races, separated by 2000-2004 average, 2008-2012 average, and
2016 alone, using election results from the five metro areas of interest.
impacts of education, as previous studies have demonstrated. The impact of proximity on its own
should not be dismissed, especially since the previous analysis demonstrates that, when controlling
for education, proximity does become a more powerful predictor of Democratic support in 2016 than
it did in the past, demonstrating movement of proximal suburbs towards Democrats. Additionally,
without the education control, the percentage of a municipality that is white actually predicts a
shift towards Democrats in 2016 (within these five metropolitan areas), further demonstrating the
profound movement of white suburbs.
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Table 15: The increasing importance of education, relative to proximity, in 2016 is consistent
across metro areas.
BOS CHA CLE LA MSP
(Intercept) −0.236∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗ −0.033 −0.350∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.037) (0.069) (0.019) (0.049)
Proximity 0.137∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.016 0.371∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.052) (0.026) (0.020)
White Pct 0.222∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.073 0.150∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.054) (0.063) (0.026) (0.050)
Num. obs. 146 23 150 136 348
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
BOS CHA CLE LA MSP
(Intercept) −0.201∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.031) (0.014) (0.041)
Proximity −0.045∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.010 −0.042∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.043) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021)
White Pct −0.064 0.144 −0.207∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.072
(0.034) (0.073) (0.030) (0.031) (0.044)
College Pct 0.584∗∗∗ 0.198∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.078) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
Num. obs. 146 23 150 136 346
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impacts of proximity, race, and education on a municipality’s
relative margin in presidential races in 2016, isolated by metro area, using election results from
the five metro areas of interest.
Figures 7A-7C demonstrate the differences between the relative margins in 2008 and
2012 (average) and 2016 in stereotypically suburban, proximal, and well-educated municipalities,
broken down by metropolitan area and weighted by each municipality’s total population. On the
whole, they demonstrate the strong impact which education had on the Democratic shift, but
the importance of proximity is made clear as well. On average, the relative margin in proximal
municipalities increased by 3.6 percentage points between 2008-2012 and 2016, by 7.4 points in
well-educated municipalities, and by 9.1 points in stereotypically suburban municipalities (those
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that are both proximal and well-educated). And even though we did see changes in the impacts
of education and proximity before 2016, comparing figure 7 to figure 3 reveals that proximal and
well-educated suburbs became much more Democratic in 2016 than they had in the past.
These patterns are largely consistent across metro areas, but there are some interesting
trends worth noting. In Los Angeles, it appears that only well-educated municipalities shifted
significantly in 2016, possibly resulting from the fact that many inner-ring Los Angeles suburbs are
more characteristically urban than suburban, while many of the well-educated, wealthier suburbs
are located further from the city center in Orange County (which voted Democratic for president in
2016 for the first time since 1936). A similar effect was visible in Boston, where proximal areas barely
changed in 2016. On the other hand, the relative margins in the Cleveland and Minneapolis areas
increased significantly, in part because much of the rest of Ohio and Minnesota swung dramatically
to the right. Ultimately, when looking at education, well-educated suburbs in all five metro areas
shifted quite similarly, and quite significantly. The extent to which, whether in Rust Belt Cleveland,
old southern Charleston, or traditionally-Republican West Coast Orange County, well-educated
voters are reacting similarly to changes in the political environment regardless of location, is made
quite clear.
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Figure 7: Across MSAs, both proximal and highly-educated municipalities became more
Democratic in 2016.
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
2008-2012 avg 2016
Year
WeightedAverageMargin
A) Weighted Average of Relative Margin in
Stereotypically Suburban Municipalities,
Presidential Elections, 2008-2012 and 2016
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
2008-2012 avg 2016
Year
WeightedAverageMargin
B) Weighted Average of Relative Margin in
Proximal Municipalities
Presidential Elections, 2000-2012 and 2016
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2008-2012 avg 2016
Year
W
ei
gh
te
d
A
ve
ra
ge
M
ar
gi
n Metro Area
Boston
Charleston
Cleveland
Los Angeles
Minneapolis-Saint Paul
Total
C) Weighted Average of Relative Margin in Highly-Educated
Municipalities, Presidential Elections
2000-2012 and 2016
Relative Democratic margin in presidential elections (2008-2012 combined and 2016) in suburban
(A), proximal (B), and highly-educated (C) municipalities, broken out by MSA, using election
results from non-core municipalities in the five metro areas of interest.
CCES data further confirms that, while proximity to city played a predictive role even
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when controlling for education, its impact was not significantly high in 2016. Limiting the CCES
sample to college educated voters living within the five metro areas analyzed here, moving from 0 to
1 on the proximity scale would increase a voter’s likelihood of voting for the Democratic presidential
candidate by 11.6 percentage points (table 16), but this effect is not statistically significant. The
effect of proximity is higher significant in in 2012, at 19.8 percentage points, and even higher in 2008,
when the effect was 34.4 percentage points. When we limit our sample to white voters alone, 2016
remains lower than 2008, although proximity does retain statistical significance, lending credence
to the idea of a growing suburban-rural divide among white voters. So while there is some evidence
of increasing stratification along proximity, this serves as further evidence that this effect is due in
large part because of the differences in education rates of those living in different parts of metro
areas, and less because of the inherent effects of proximity.
Table 16: Among college educated voters, proximity mattered less as a predictor of vote choice
in 2016.
2008 (All) 2012 (All) 2016 (All) 2008 (White) 2012 (White) 2016 (White)
Proximity 0.344∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.116 0.355∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.223∗∗
(0.095) (0.065) (0.060) (0.101) (0.074) (0.072)
Age −0.001 −0.003∗ −0.002∗ −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.103∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.112∗ 0.092∗ 0.094∗
(0.050) (0.034) (0.030) (0.053) (0.039) (0.037)
White −0.148∗ −0.104∗ −0.107∗∗
(0.074) (0.040) (0.033)
Num. obs. 422 854 1061 373 665 748
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of proximity and demographic controls on presidential vote choice
(2008-2016), using CCES data on college educated and white college educated voters in non-core
cities in the five metro areas of interest.
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3.2.3 Investigating the Demographic Change Hypothesis
Beyond the simple fact that white, college educated, suburban voters have been moving
away from the Republican Party for years now, and did so at an accelerating pace in the 2016
Presidential Election, there is an alternative explanation for why some suburbs saw such massive
change in 2016 - that of demographic change. While favorable demographic shifts in places like
Florida and Texas were unable to deliver the presidency to Hillary Clinton, in some rapidly-growing
suburban counties, like Loudoun County, Virginia and Orange County, California, Clinton was
able to dramatically outperform previous Democrats, and more so than in many other suburbs.
Many observers have chalked this up to demographic change, with the percentage of nonwhite
residents skyrocketing in Orange County (Baldassare 2018), or places like Loudoun becoming both
more racially diverse and highly-educated (Portnoy 2016). But the role which changes in racial
composition played in 2016, in comparison to the overwhelmingly strong role of education among
white voters, has not yet been isolated in academic literature.
Looking at municipality-level data, it does appear that in a rapidly-changing metro area
like Los Angeles, demographic change did play a major role in shifts in 2016, but this effect does
not hold nationwide. Table 17 contains the results of linear regressions on the difference between
the Democratic relative margin in 2016 and the average of the 2008 and 2012 relative margins,
with the change in a municipality’s percentage of residents who are white, the percentage with
a college degree, and proximity as independent variables. As expected, when controlling for no
other variables, the change in white percentage is inversely related with the relative margin, with
a decline in the white percentage by 10 percentage points boosting the Democratic relative margin
by 1.87 points. When factoring in college education, this effect declines to 1.26 points, but remains
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statistically significant. However, when also including proximity, the change in white population
is not significant at all, suggesting that the changing impact of proximity to city and education
are more significant than demographic change. But if we look solely at the Los Angeles metro
area, these results look quite different. The impact of demographic change is much stronger in
Los Angeles suburbs, and it remains significant even when controlling for college education and
proximity, seeming to outweigh those effects. In that sense, the demographic change story is
clearly not as simple as nonwhite, likely Democratic voters moving into traditionally-Republican
areas, making them more Democratic, although that certainly plays a role. Instead, it seems that
in rapidly-diversifying metro areas, like Los Angeles, significant demographic change that has a
fundamental impact on a municipality’s composition can bring about political change. In that
sense, it makes sense for Democrats to see a political future in places like Orange County, not only
because the old residents have changing political views, but because the new ones are reshaping
the larger political environment.
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Table 17: The impact of change in the percentage of population that is white is statistically
significant in Los Angeles, but not nationwide.
Total Total Total LA LA LA
(Intercept) 0.002 −0.135∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ 0.014∗ −0.023∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
Change in White Pct −0.187∗∗ −0.126∗ −0.070 −0.538∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗ −0.471∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.058) (0.053) (0.120) (0.115) (0.113)
College Pct 0.380∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024)
Proximity 0.145∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.011) (0.018)
Num. obs. 801 799 799 136 136 136
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for impact of change in the percentage of a municipality’s population
that is white, with controls for education and proximity, on the difference in 2008-2012 average
Democratic relative margin and the 2016 relative margin, using election results from non-core
cities in the five metro areas of interest and the Los Angeles area alone.
3.2.4 Ideological Predictors of the Suburban Vote
While it’s well-established that college educated voters became more Democratic in 2016,
there has been less investigation as to why. Much of the analysis of the shift among college educated
voters has revolved around Donald Trump’s rhetoric on race and immigration, and how people with
college educations are more likely to be exposed to racial and ethnic diversity, although the direction
of causality is not entirely clear (Silver 2016). In fact, Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2018) find that,
when including controls for views on black people and illegal immigrants, the difference in vote
preference between college educated and non-college educated white voters virtually disappears.
But a few questions need to be answered - namely, the extent to which Trump actually prompted
movement in ideology, as opposed to simply making different ideological viewpoints more salient,
and how these trends differ from past years. Additionally, expanding on the analyses that have
already been done, I look into the ideological patterns of suburban voters as a whole, rather than
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just white college educated voters. Overall, it appears as if white suburban and college educated
voters did shift their opinions and placed priority on different issues than in previous years, but
not to the drastic extent that some may expect.
An analysis of ANES data demonstrates some movement of college educated voters to-
wards more liberal issue positions. Looking at the average placement of college educated ANES
respondents on 0 to 1 scales for abortion, aid to blacks, and government spending, we can see ways
in which 2016 deviated from past trends. As shown in figure 8, white college educated respon-
dents became slightly more liberal on abortion, although this change is small and consistent with a
longer-term trend of liberalization on cultural issues. On government spending, these respondents
became noticeably more liberal than in 2012, increasing their average score by about 0.07 points.
This is somewhat unexpected, given that Donald Trump’s economic promises during the campaign
were more populist than traditional Republicans, and therefore less likely to appeal to white college
educated voters. However, it should be noted that the spending scores are still lower than in 2000,
2004, and 2008, and seem to represent a reversion to the mean from an unusually conservative
economic position in 2012. Finally, on aid to blacks, the impacts of Trump seem the most signif-
icant, with Trump’s rhetoric on race prompting a clear backlash among college educated voters.
Following a gradual decline in the average placement of these respondents on the aid to blacks scale
between 2004 and 2012, this figure moved 0.12 points in the liberal direction in 2016, the largest
change between years of any issue in any pair of elections. While it’s not possible using these data
to explicitly attribute these effects to Trump, the increased salience of racial issues in 2016, com-
bined with the known relationship between education and racial acceptance, suggests that college
educated voters didn’t just change their votes in 2016, but were actually pushed ideologically.
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Figure 8: College educated voters became much more liberal on aid to blacks, continued
becoming slightly more liberal on abortion in 2016.
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An analysis of CCES data among white respondents in the five metro areas of interest
confirms Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek’s main findings, while exposing some other interesting infor-
mation about the role of proximity, education, and ideology. Unfortunately, the 2016 CCES did
not ask respondents about affirmative action, instead using a variety of new questions on racial
resentment to gauge respondents’ opinions on minorities. So while a direct comparison between
the role of racial resentment pre-2016 and in 2016 is not possible, I use the results of one question,
whether “white people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin” as
the closest analogue to the question about affirmative action. This variable is recoded as a binary
variable, with respondents who strongly or somewhat agree coded as 1, and those who strongly or
somewhat disagree coded as 0. The results below demonstrate that, among voters in metro areas,
belief in racial inequality does indeed diminish the impact of education to statistical insignificance,
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just as it did in previous elections (table 18). Comparing the coefficients for proximity and ed-
ucation in the regressions that control for each of the demographic positions, we see that belief
in racial inequality is by far the issue that is most responsible for proximal and college educated
voters’ positions. This, combined with the fact that college educated voters became more liberal
on racial issues between 2012 and 2016, suggests that the larger suburban shift in 2016 was due to
the higher salience of racial issues. However, proximity to city still holds a statistically significant
impact on vote choice in 2016 even when controlling for both education and views on race, sug-
gesting that there is something unique about the way in which suburban voters vote, even going
beyond positions about other races.
Looking at the roles of abortion and government spending, the trends look roughly in
line with expectations (table 18). Views on abortion are slightly more predictive of white voters’
issue stances in 2016 than in 2008 and 2012, which makes sense given the culture war framing
of the 2016 election, but not significantly so, as race and immigration were much more salient in
2016 than issues like abortion or gay marriage. On the other hand, the predictive power of views
on spending dropped significantly, in line with the fact that Trump did not heavily emphasize
conservative economic policies, and won over many traditionally Democratic white voters who
remain somewhat liberal on fiscal issues. Overall, the 2016 presidential election did not represent a
massive deviation from past races, with proximity to city and education serving as strong predictors
of Democratic support among white voters, and cultural and racial issues rising in importance as
fiscal issues decline. Ultimately, before 2016, racial issues appear to have been pushing proximal
and college educated voters out of the Republican Party, so the heightened salience of racial issues
in 2016 likely accelerated their movement.
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Table 18: Views on racial inequality are the most significant factors as to why proximal and
college educated voters voted Democratic in 2016.
2008-12 2008-12 2008-12 2016 2016 2016
Proximity 0.164∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.045) (0.050) (0.046)
College Educated 0.049∗ 0.028 0.059∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.049 0.116∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
Age −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.056∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.051 0.052∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
White −0.178∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.155∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026)
Abortion View 0.450∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020)
Affirmative Action View 0.581∗∗∗
(0.015)
Spending View 0.664∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019)
Racial Inequality View 0.604∗∗∗
(0.020)
Num. obs. 2889 2900 2886 2245 1914 2224
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of proximity, demographics, and issue positions on presidential vote choice
(2008-2012 combined and 2016 alone), using CCES data on voters in non-core cities in the five
metro areas of interest.
Of course, the primary, explicit focus of Donald Trump’s campaign wasn’t simply on
heightening negative sentiments from white voters towards other races in general; Trump empha-
sized another, largely racially-charged issue in immigration. Unfortunately, with the exception of
one question in 2006 about a specific immigration proposal, the CCES didn’t ask about immigration
until 2010, making a full exploration of pre-2016 immigration attitudes difficult. But since 2010,
respondents were asked whether they would support a policy to “grant legal status to all illegal
immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any
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felony crimes,” which will be used here as a general proxy for feelings on immigration. Running
the same empirical tests as conducted above, looking at whether proximity and education correlate
with views on immigration stronger than in past years, and whether immigration can explain the
movement of proximal and college educated voters, I attempt to isolate whether immigration as a
specific issue can explain the suburban shift.
Somewhat unexpectedly, immigration appears to be a much less significant factor in ex-
plaining the suburban vote than views on advantages held by white people. Despite the heightened
salience of immigration issues in the 2016 election, education, proximity, and race are all less pre-
dictive of respondents’ views on immigration than they were in past years, at least within these
five MSAs (table 19). Additionally, relative to past years and other issues, immigration doesn’t
appear to have weighed heavily on voters’ preferences, with proximity and education still unusually
strong predictors of voting patterns when factoring in controls for views on immigration, while
immigration itself was actually a weaker predictor of top-of-ticket voting in 2016 than it was in any
of the three previous election cycles (table 20). So while racial issues, like they were before Trump
came along, were clearly partially responsible for the suburban shift, the story is not as simple as
Donald Trump propagating divisive rhetoric on immigration, creating a suburban-rural divide on
immigration issues. Rather, it is more likely that, in creating a campaign that made overall racial
issues more salient, Donald Trump was able to activate voters along their previously-held views on
the positions of white people in society, an issue broader than immigration itself.
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Table 19: Education, proximity, and race are weaker predictors of immigration viewpoints in
2016 than in previous years.
2010 2012 2014 2016
Proximity 0.134∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.086∗
(0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039)
College Educated 0.090∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
White −0.118∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.051∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
Num. obs. 2235 2103 2431 2589
Log Likelihood -1493.019 -1423.893 -1646.784 -1773.848
AIC 2994.037 2855.786 3301.568 3555.695
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of education, proximity, and race on views on immigration, using CCES
data on voters in non-core cities in the five metro areas of interest.
Table 20: Education and proximity are still strong predictors of vote choice in 2016, even when
considering views on immigration.
2010 2012 2014 2016
Proximity 0.263∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.069 0.178∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.044)
College Educated 0.065∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.036 0.105∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023)
Age −0.001 −0.002∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.118∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023)
White −0.137∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026)
Immigration View 0.523∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020)
Num. obs. 1810 1876 1674 2251
Log Likelihood -955.300 -1002.944 -952.045 -1290.733
AIC 1924.601 2019.889 1918.089 2595.467
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Mean Marginal Effects of proximity, demographics, and position on immigration on vote choice
(presidential and gubernatorial), using CCES data on voters in non-core cities in the five metro
areas of interest.
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3.3 The Elections of 2018: A Permanent Suburban Shift?
If suburbs were the under-covered story of the 2016 election, the same cannot be said of
the 2018 midterms, in which Democrats capitalized on suburbanites’ disdain for President Trump
to gain 40 seats in the House of Representatives and win a majority for the first time since 2008.
One article in CNN, written about a month before Election Day, blames Republicans’ suburban
weaknesses on many of the unique controversies that plagued the Trump Administration, including
the President’s controversial and often racist language, the controversy over sexual assault alle-
gations against Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh, and the looming threat of the Special
Counsel investigation into President Trump and his campaign’s alleged collusion with the Rus-
sian government (Brownstein 2018). A piece published in Vox, written about two months after
Election Day, focuses more on the issues at the heart of the midterms, and argues that subur-
ban voters prioritized funding for healthcare and education, a sign of an actual ideological shift
in traditionally-conservative suburbs, while being turned off by President Trump’s immigration
policies. Additionally, the article points out that, in New York, New Jersey, and California, which
together accounted for 14 of the House seats gained by Democrats, new caps on the State and Lo-
cal Tax (SALT) deduction in the Republican Tax Bill passed in late 2017 may have further turned
away suburban voters (Scott 2018).
Whatever the reason, it’s impossible to argue that the suburban shift wasn’t responsible
for Democratic successes in 2018. An analysis from Geoffrey Skelley at FiveThirtyEight demon-
strates that Democratic House pickups were heavily concentrated in sparse suburban and dense
suburban districts, which combined for 28 of the Democrats’ 40 net gains (Skelley 2018). Past
political leanings of the districts seemed to make little impact, with a full 33% of Democratic gains
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(as of the article’s publication on November 8, 2018) coming in suburban or partially-suburban
districts won by both Mitt Romney in 2012 and Donald Trump and 2016, outpacing the number
of seats picked up in Romney-Clinton districts. And while the margins varied, Democratic gains in
suburban seats ran the gamut from seats like Virginia’s 10th Congressional District, a Washington,
DC-area seat that has voted Democratic for President since 2008, to semi-urban and suburban
districts around smaller cities, like South Carolina’s 1st and Oklahoma’s 5th, which never voted for
Obama or Clinton yet still swung massively against Trump and the Republicans in 2018. In the
analyses below, I look further at suburban municipalities to determine which characteristics led
them to vote Democratic in 2018, whether the places that swung the most dramatically in 2016
stayed as strongly Democratic in 2018, and what the results from 2018 may mean for Democratic
futures in the suburbs.
3.3.1 Predictors of Vote Patterns in 2018
Comparing the roles of proximity, education, and race in the 2018 gubernatorial elections
to those in past years reveals a clear pattern, that proximal areas were becoming more Democratic
in 2018 just as they were in 2016 (table 20). Without controls for education, the increase in a
municipality’s Democratic relative margin resulting from moving closer to the city center nearly
doubles from 2010 and 2014 to 2018, and goes up by over a factor of 3.5 from 2002 and 2006
to 2018. This all occurs while the negative role of a municipality’s percentage of residents who
are white declines, suggesting that white, proximal municipalities are becoming more Democratic,
even in gubernatorial races that are less tied to the national political environment. Like what
we saw with presidential election results, when factoring in controls for education, the predictive
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power of proximity increases before 2018 but declines slightly in 2018 (relative to the regression
conducted without the education controls), again suggesting that this change in the suburban vote
is due in large part to movement of college educated voters, but still demonstrating an inherent
impact of proximity. Education itself is a strongly negative predictor of Democratic relative margin
before 2018, but in 2018 did not have a statistically significant relationship with the margin, again
showing the dramatic movement of college educated voters in suburban areas around major cities.
This likely suggests some influence of President Trump’s brand on views of the Republican Party as
a whole, continuing to turn off suburban voters even when his name isn’t on the ballot. However,
whether this effect would hold after Trump is out of office cannot yet be determined.
Table 21: In 2018, proximal and highly-educated municipalities both moved towards the
Democrats.
2002-2006 2010-2014 2018 2002-2006 2010-2014 2018
(Intercept) 0.222∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.046 0.218∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.050
(0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032)
Proximity 0.095∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.025) (0.037)
White Pct −0.384∗∗∗ −0.395∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036)
College Pct −0.293∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.035) (0.034) (0.050)
Num. obs. 1494 1666 833 1482 1658 829
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impact of proximity, race, and education on relative
Democratic margin in gubernatorial elections (2002-2006 average, 2010-2014 average, and 2018
alone), using election results in non-core municipalities in the five metro areas of interest.
In order to determine whether 2018 represented a continuation, acceleration, or reversion
of the effects seen in 2016, I now analyze the demographic predictors of movement in 2018 congres-
sional and gubernatorial votes, in comparison with 2014 and 2016. (Note that, in the regressions
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below that involve congressional vote, along with all further analyses of congressional vote, all
municipalities in the Boston area and some municipalities in the Los Angeles area are excluded
because their congressional races were either uncontested or involved two Democrats in either 2016
or 2018.) In some regards, these data do make 2018 look like a continuation, or even acceleration,
of the trends seen in 2016 (table 22). As expected, proximity and education have large, fairly sig-
nificant impacts on a municipality’s movement between 2014 and 2018, demonstrating the impact
which the changing national environment had on the 2018 midterms, especially in the suburbs.
Additionally, when comparing the 2016 congressional vote to the 2018 congressional vote, prox-
imity and education have similarly large impacts, although highly-educated districts swung more
heavily than proximal ones, suggesting that suburbs further from cities may have been more willing
to split tickets in 2016. This is consistent with the larger trend of congressional districts won in
2016 by both Hillary Clinton and Republican congressional candidates ousting their Republican
representatives in 2018, with the number of such Clinton/Republican districts dropping from 23
to 3 after the 2018 elections. As shown in figure 9 (and in the full MSA breakdown in appendix
E), 2018 clearly represented positive movement for the Democrats in congressional races in subur-
ban and highly-educated areas, especially in the Los Angeles, Charleston, and Minneapolis metro
areas, all of which contained at least one House seat flipped by Democrats in 2018. However, not
all data point to the permanence of the suburban shift. If we compare the 2016 relative presiden-
tial margins to the 2018 relative gubernatorial margins, it appears that 2018 actually represented
some reversion to the mean, with both proximity and education predicting movement towards the
Republican Party, albeit not enough to completely reverse the changes seen in 2016. The 2018
midterms certainly demonstrate additional movement of suburban voters towards the Democratic
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Party, but without Trump himself on the ballot, a small subset of suburbanites may be moving
back.
Table 22: In 2018, proximal and highly-educated municipalities became more Democratic
relative to 2014 and 2016 congressional results, but not relative to 2016 presidential results.
2014-2018 Relative Gov 2016-2018 Congress 2016 Relative Pres-2018 Relative Gov
(Intercept) −0.091∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.036
(0.012) (0.016) (0.026)
Proximity 0.126∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.030)
White Pct −0.047∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.029)
College Pct 0.212∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ −0.087∗
(0.019) (0.027) (0.041)
Num. obs. 801 624 801
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for impact of proximity, race, and education on the differences between
the relative Democratic gubernatorial margins in 2014 and 2018, the congressional margins in
2016 and 2018, and the relative presidential margin in 2016 and the relative gubernatorial margin
in 2018, using election results from non-core municipalities in the five metro areas of interest.
Regressions involving congressional races exclude all Boston area and some Los Angeles area
municipalities.
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Figure 9: Well-educated, suburban, and proximal municipalities all became more Democratic
between 2014 and 2018.
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A few additional analyses further confirm that 2018 seemed to lie somewhere between
2014 and 2016 in terms of Democratic strength in the suburbs. Running a simple linear regression
that looks at the 2014-2018 relative gubernatorial margin change, the 2016-2018 congressional
margin change, and the 2016-2018 relative margin change (comparing presidential and gubernatorial
relative margins), with the 2012-2016 relative margin change as the independent variable, along
with controls for individual municipalities, we are able to determine how 2018 fits in with the trends
seen in 2016. As shown in figure 23, a municipality’s 2014-2018 swing is roughly 4.5 percentage
points plus 65.3% of its 2012-2016 swing, while its 2016-2018 congressional swing is about 13
percentage points plus 87.0% of its 2012-2016 change, both of which are statistically-significant
figures. Therefore, we can see that 2018 represents both a projection of 2016 presidential trends onto
both gubernatorial and congressional races, with those down-ballot races that hadn’t previously
been affected by Donald Trump also slipping away from Republicans in suburban areas. However,
a municipality’s 2012-2016 relative margin change corresponds with a shift in the opposite direction
between the 2016 presidential and 2018 gubernatorial races, further demonstrating how 2016 may
have been an unusually strong year for Democrats in the suburbs. Figure 10, which looks at the
average relative margins between 2014 and 2018, specifically among places that had fairly high 2012-
2016 relative margin swings (above 6 percentage points), further confirms this. Places that swung
most strongly towards the Democrats tended to be somewhat Republican in 2014 and become fairly
Democratic in 2016, before becoming slightly less strongly Democratic in 2018.
Without significant opinion survey data, it’s hard to isolate exactly why suburbanites
remained so strongly Democratic in 2018. Some pre-election polling data, which asked voters
about specific issues in addition to their congressional preferences, can provide insight, even if they
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Table 23: Municipalities that became more Democratic in 2016 became more Democratic,
relative to 2014 gubernatorial and 2016 congressional races, in 2018.
2014-2018 Relative Gov 2016-2018 Cong 2016 Relative Pres-2018 Relative Gov
(Intercept) 0.045 0.130 0.434∗
(0.064) (0.084) (0.209)
Relative Margin 0.653∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗ −1.236∗∗
Change, 2012-16 (0.121) (0.218) (0.395)
Num. obs. 803 626 803
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impact of 2012-2016 relative margin change on the differences
between the relative Democratic gubernatorial margins in 2014 and 2018, the congressional
margins in 2016 and 2018, and the relative presidential margin in 2016 and the relative
gubernatorial margin in 2018, using election results from non-core municipalities in the five metro
areas of interest. Regressions involving congressional races exclude all Boston area and some Los
Angeles area municipalities.
don’t break out voters by education and geography. In one poll of voters in 69 House battleground
districts, conducted by the Washington Post about a month before Election Day, voters’ divides
on economic and other issues could reveal which issues drove electoral decisions (Clement and Balz
2018). The poll found that 77% of voters in these districts would rate the economy as excellent
or good, but only 36% thought that the country was moving in the right direction, when asked
to consider issues other than the economy. When looking at these “other” issues that voters may
have been considering, voters identified the Supreme Court, Donald Trump himself, and healthcare
as more important than the economy, with immigration only slightly less important. For voters
in these largely-suburban battleground districts, cultural and racial issues, like Brett Kavanaugh’s
sexual assault allegations and President Trump’s hardline stance on immigration, seemed to drive
negative perceptions of the Republican Party as a whole, hurting the party’s electoral chances in the
suburbs. Additionally, a Pew Research survey from May 2018 identifies growing divides between
suburban and rural voters on some key issues (Parker et al. 2018). While suburban voters had
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Figure 10: Municipalities that swung the most between 2012 and 2016 tended to stay
Democratic in 2018.
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only slightly more liberal views than rural voters on the role of the government in helping to “solve
problems,” their views were much closer to urban voters on issues of immigration, racial equality,
and Donald Trump himself. Alternatively, in some of the metro areas analyzed here that shifted
strongly towards the Democrats in 2018, including Los Angeles and Charleston, some unique local
factors may have come into play - the SALT deduction controversy likely hurt Republicans among
the very wealthy Orange County voters who flipped four congressional seats to the Democrats, while
the defeat of anti-Trump Republican Mark Sanford in the Republican Primary in South Carolina’s
1st district, located in and around Charleston, may have pushed enough suburban Republicans
to stay home or vote Democratic in November. Ultimately, it appears as if the 2018 midterms
represented a perfect storm for Democrats in suburban areas; Trump’s focus on immigration, his
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defense of Brett Kavanaugh, and his failure to make the economy more salient could have allowed
Democrats to pick up voters who may have voted Republican down-ballot in 2016, but who would
rather have a Congress that stood up to Trump than one that supported him.
4 Discussion
Returning to my original hypotheses, it appears that my speculations about college edu-
cated and suburban voters were largely correct, but some caveats are needed. On the national level,
college educated voters seemed to get more Democratic between 2000 and 2012, but this trend is
not as simple as the percentage of college graduates voting Democratic increasing year-over-year.
Indeed, this trend seems largely due to movement between 2000 and 2004, and almost entirely
among nonwhite college graduates, although the statistical insignificance of college education as a
predictor of vote choice until 2012 does suggest some gradual sorting along educational lines. As
my deeper analyses of suburban municipalities show, the biggest shifts between 2000 and 2012 came
not in municipalities that are largely college educated or largely suburban, but in municipalities
that are both close to cities and have high percentages of college graduates. Given the gradual
liberalizing of college educated voters on abortion, the large extent to which racial issues seemed
to factor into voters’ decision-making, and the growing fiscal liberalism of white college educated
voters living near cities, along with the perception of the Republican Party moving to the right on
cultural and racial issues, we can understand why college educated suburban voters would have felt
more drawn to the Democrats. Taken together, we can conclude that, for a multitude of possible
reasons, college educated suburban voters certainly became more Democratic between 2000 and
the rise of Donald Trump.
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My second hypothesis, in which I posited that proximity was an important factor in the
2016 elections, is also largely true. Proximal municipalities within metropolitan areas became more
Democratic than non-proximal ones, and the shift among proximal and well-educated municipalities
was higher than it was in well-educated municipalities as a whole, demonstrating some unique
impact to proximity. Additionally, proximal municipalities became more Democratic, relative to
2008 and 2012, than they did in any election between 2000 and 2012. However, the effect of
proximity was clearly dwarfed by college education, with proximity being a far less important factor
in the vote choices of college educated voters than it was in past years. Ultimately, proximity clearly
drove voters to prefer Democratic candidates, but the change in the impact of proximity was much
smaller than the change in the impact of education. In that sense, 2016 represented both evolution
and revolution in the suburbs - slight movement towards the Democrats in the broad category
of suburbs as a whole, with much more significant movement in the stereotypical highly-educated
suburbs. Such trends appear to be due to more than just demographic changes, although rising
nonwhite populations in some areas certainly made a difference. In 2016, college educated voters
became much more liberal on racial issues, while viewing the Republican Party as much more
conservative on such issues, although college educated (and, to a lesser extent, proximal) voters
seemed to move towards the Democratic Party for reasons other than ideology.
Finally, I hypothesized that suburban voters would be more Democratic in 2018 than
in 2014, but less so than in 2016, and this appears to be the case. The same patterns that pre-
dicted movement towards the Democratic Party between 2012 and 2016 in suburban areas, namely
proximity and education, both predicted pro-Democratic movement between the 2014 and 2018
gubernatorial elections. However, when we compare 2018 gubernatorial margins to 2016 presiden-
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tial margins, the suburbs shifted in the Republican direction, relative to the other municipalities in
their states, suggesting some reversion to pre-2016 means in suburban areas, rural areas, or (in all
likelihood) both. However, when we compare congressional margins in 2016 and 2018, suburban
areas seemed to continue to move in the Democratic direction, which could suggest that, on some
level, the suburban shift seen at the presidential level in 2016 may be extending down ballot.
So what does this all mean for the future of American politics? As of right now, it’s hard
to determine whether the future of the Democratic Party is really in the suburbs. On the one hand,
the significant suburban shift that occurred between 2000 and 2004 largely stayed in place in 2008
and 2012, which bodes well for the durability of the 2012-2016 swing. Looking at the roles that
cultural issues and perceptions of President Bush played on moving suburban voters away from
the Republican Party, it’s telling that college educated and proximal voters stayed Democratic
even without Bush on the ballot. In that context, we may expect post-Trump voting coalitions to
look a lot like current ones, at least until some outside force comes in and shakes up the political
environment the way that Trump did. But the shift between 2000 and 2004, while significant, pales
in comparison to the shift between 2012 and 2016, so it could be much harder for the Democrats to
hang onto all of their new suburban voters. Furthermore, given the extent to which the heightened
salience of racial issues and the declined importance of fiscal issues affected suburban voters in
2016, there seems to be an opportunity for Republicans, who could hypothetically win back these
voters by putting forward a candidate more like Mitt Romney than Donald Trump.
Whether such a candidate exists and would have support among a Republican primary
electorate, however, remains a different story. As anti-Trump suburban Republicans move towards
the Democratic Party, Trump himself continues to be popular among the Republican base, surpass-
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ing even Ronald Reagan and post-9/11 George W. Bush in first-term popularity (Enten 2018). And
President Trump himself doesn’t appear to recognize any need to change. After the 2018 midterms,
he doubled down on the anti-immigrant sentiment that arguably cost his party the House, going so
far as to shut down the government for 35 days and declare a State of Emergency in an attempt to
secure funding for a wall on the Mexican border. While the Republican-controlled Senate’s rebuke
of the State of Emergency seems like a rejection of Trumpist policies, many Republican senators up
for reelection in 2020 who had previously rebuked Trump’s immigration agenda, including Lindsey
Graham of South Carolina and Thom Thillis of North Carolina, voted to uphold the President’s
declaration. While it’s hard to ascribe motive to any single vote, it’s not much of a leap to conclude
that President Trump’s immigration agenda has taken hold among the Republican Party base (see
Gross and Sides 2019 for polling on the partisan polarization of the immigration issue). Thus, even
if the Republican Party has the capacity to win back suburban voters who reject President Trump’s
stances on racial issues, questions remain as to whether it will even try.
This is not to say that the Democratic Party is a natural home for dissatisfied, ex-
Republican suburban voters, even if they voted for Democrats in 2016 and 2018. Analysis of 2016
data demonstrates that suburban and college educated voters didn’t become more Democratic
because their views on economic issues aligned with the party, but rather because economic issues
likely became less of a deciding factor in vote choices. We certainly don’t have enough data on
vote preferences in 2018 to determine whether a Democratic Party that is moving to the left on
economic issues might turn away suburban voters, but it’s certainly possible that they run the
risk of doing so. Of course, some aforementioned polling does counter this conventional wisdom
that suburbanites are more conservative on economic issues (Scott 2018). In the end, with limited
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data from Trump-era midterms and no data from any post-Trump elections, it’s hard to say how
suburbanites are reacting to changes that are occurring in both parties.
Ultimately, the lack of detailed opinion data from 2018 makes it difficult to speculate
how suburbanites vote without Trump on the ballot. Many suburban voters who split their tickets
and voted Republican for congress in 2016 voted Democratic in 2018, but there are two plausible
explanations for this pattern that portend vastly different views on suburban voting as a whole.
If, as some speculated, these voters expected that Hillary Clinton would win in 2016 and wanted
a Republican Congress to check her liberal policies, but in 2018 wanted a Democratic Congress to
check Trump’s populist policies, it’s possible that these voters may not be Democrats as much as
traditional Republicans who were dissatisfied with Trump. But if these voters truly shifted from
being split-ticket moderates to straight-ticket Democrats, they may be more likely to stick with the
Democratic Party going forward.
Given the way that the 2016 and 2018 elections worked out, it’s easy to see a world in
which the suburbs continue to move Democratic relative to rural areas because both parties decide
that this pattern is electorally ideal. After all, even as Democrats won back the House on their
strength in suburban areas, Republicans were able to gain seats in the Senate by continuing to
make inroads in rural areas in states like North Dakota and Missouri. And with the way that the
2020 election will likely come down to states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, all of
which saw Democrats win statewide in 2018 by doing better in suburbs than in previous midterm
elections, it’s possible that both parties will make the electoral calculation to let the suburbs go
Democratic. In the end, though, the suburbs will be worth watching in the next few years, especially
once President Trump is out of office, to see if we’re really in the midst of a long-term change in
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party coalitions.
5 Conclusion
The suburban shift of 2016, while more dramatic than in past elections, was not a new
phenomenon, building on top of an existing movement of college educated voters living close to
cities that has existed since at least 2004. In that context alone, given that a significant shift of
suburban voters back towards the Republican Party has not occurred, it makes sense to believe
that Democrats are not likely to lose their emerging suburban coalition any time soon. As long
as the Republican Party continues to emphasize a brand of cultural and racial conservatism that
clearly pushes away those living in suburban areas, there’s little reason to believe that they will
be able to win back college educated and proximal voters, especially given that their pursuit of
conservative economic policy in the first two years of the Trump Administration failed to bring
back many anti-Trump voters into the party fold. But the nature of the American political system
makes it difficult to assess what such a shift really means for party majorities. If we assume that
Democrats are solidifying a coalition of nonwhite and suburban white voters, can that win them
a country whose political system is set up to give disproportionate representation to whiter, more
rural areas? And can that coalition really power the “emerging Democratic majority” that Judis
and Teixeira promised 15 years ago? It’s certainly possible, but it may be too early to tell.
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8.1 Appendix A: ANES Question Wordings
Issue Question Response Options
Abortion
There has been some discussion about
abortion during recent years. I am going
to read you a short list of opinions.
Please tell me which one of the opinions
best agrees with your view? You can
just tell me the number of the opinion
you choose.
1. By law, abortion should never be
permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only
in case of rape, incest, or when the
woman’s life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for
reasons other than rape, incest, or danger
to the woman’s life, but only after
the need for the abortion has been clearly
established.
4. By law, a woman should always be
able to obtain an abortion as a matter
of personal choice.
Aid to Blacks
Some people feel that the government
in Washington should make every
effort to improve the social and economic
position of blacks. (Suppose these people
are at one end of a scale, at point 1.)
Others feel that the government should
not make any special effort to help blacks
because they should help themselves.
(Suppose these people are at the other
end, at point 7.) And, of course, some
other people have opinions somewhere
in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6.
Scale from 1 (”Government should help
blacks”) to 7 (”Blacks should help
themselves”)
Spending
Some people think the government
should provide fewer services even
in areas such as health and education
in order to reduce spending. Suppose
these people are at one end of a scale,
at point 1. Other people feel it is
important for the government to
provide many more services even if it
means an increase in spending.
Suppose these people are at the other
end, at point 7. And, of course, some
other people have opinions
somewhere in between, at points
2,3,4,5 or 6.
Scale from 1 (”Government should
provide many fewer services”) to 7
(”Government should provide many
more services”)
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8.2 Appendix B: Gubernatorial Results by Proximity, Race, and Education
(2002-2014)
2002 2006 2010 2014
(Intercept) 0.044 −0.233∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.027)
Proximity 0.347∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.024) (0.033)
College Pct −0.243∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗∗ −0.077 −0.091
(0.065) (0.062) (0.043) (0.057)
White Pct −0.249∗∗∗ 0.073∗ −0.500∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034)
Num. obs. 651 798 798 801
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
OLS regression coefficients for the impact of proximity, education, and race on Democratic
gubernatorial vote margin in non-core municipalities (2002-2014), using election results from the
five metro areas of interest.
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8.3 Appendix C: Presidential Results in Suburban, Proximal, andWell-Educated
Municipalities, Broken Out by MSA
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8.4 Appendix D: CCES Question Wordings
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2006
Issue Question Response Options
Abortion
There has been some discussion about
abortion during recent years. Which
one of the opinions on this page best
agrees with your view on this issue?
1. By law, abortion should never
be permitted
2.The law should permit abortion
only in case of rape, incest or
when the woman’s life is in
danger
3. The law should permit abortion
for reasons other than rape, incest,
or danger to the woman’s life,
but only after the need for the
abortion has been clearly
established
4. By law, a woman should always
be able to obtain an abortion as a
matter of personal choice
Affirmative Action
Some people think that if a company
has a history of discriminating against
blacks when making hiring decisions,
then they should be required to have an
affirmative action program that gives
blacks preference in hiring. What do
you think? Should companies that
have discriminated against blacks have
to have an affirmative action program?
Scale from 1 (Strongly Support
Affirmative Action) to 7 (Strongly
Oppose Affirmative
Action)
Spending
The federal budget is currently running
a $300 billion deficit. If the Congress
were to balance the budget it would have
to consider cutting defense spending,
cutting domestic spending, raising taxes,
or borrowing money to cover the deficit.
What would you most prefer that
Congress do - cut domestic spending, cut
military spending, raise taxes, or borrow
funds?
1. Cut Domestic Spending
2. Cut Defense Spending
3. Raise Taxes
4. Borrow
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2008-2014
Issue Question Response Options
Abortion
Which one of the opinions on this page
best agrees with your view on this
issue?
1. By law, abortion should never
be permitted
2.The law should permit abortion
only in case of rape, incest or
when the woman’s life is in
danger
3. The law should permit abortion
for reasons other than rape, incest,
or danger to the woman’s life,
but only after the need for the
abortion has been clearly
established
4. By law, a woman should always
be able to obtain an abortion as a
matter of personal choice
Affirmative Action
Affirmative action programs give
preference to racial minorities in
employment and college admissions
in order to correct for past discrimination.
Do you support or oppose affirmative
action?
1. Strongly support
2. Somewhat support
3. Somewhat oppose
4. Strongly oppose
Spending
The federal budget is currently running
a [figure varies] deficit. If the Congress
were to balance the budget it would have
to consider cutting defense spending,
cutting domestic spending (such as
Medicare and Social Security), or raising
taxes, to cover the deficit. What would
you most prefer that Congress do - cut
domestic spending, cut military spending,
or raise taxes?
1. Cut Domestic Spending
2. Cut Defense Spending
3. Raise Taxes
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2016
Issue Question Response Options
Abortion
Do you support or oppose each of the
following proposals? Always allow a
woman to obtain an abortion as a
matter of choice
1. Support
2. Oppose
Racial
Inequality
White people in the U.S. have certain
advantages because of the color of
their skin.
1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Neither agree nor
disagree
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Strongly disagree
Spending
The federal deficit is approximately $1
trillion this year. If the Congress
were to balance the budget it would have
to consider cutting defense spending,
cutting domestic spending (such as
Medicare and Social Security), or raising
taxes, to cover the deficit. What would
you most prefer that Congress do?
1. Cut Domestic Spending
2. Cut Defense Spending
3. Raise Taxes
8.5 Appendix E: 2014-2018 Relative Margins, Broken Out by MSA
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